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THE SCOPE OF CRIMINAL RESTITUTION: AWARDING UNLIQUIDATED 
DAMAGES IN SENTENCING HEARINGS 
BRADFORD C. MANK* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the past several years a variety of victim groups have forced 
the criminal justice system to pay more attention to the restitution needs 
of victims.! Criminal courts, however, are still limited in the types of 
restitution they may award. Typically, sentencing judges can award 
restitution for the whole range of liquidated damages including the value 
of stolen or destroyed property, medical expenses, and lost past wages.2 
In most jurisdictions, however, criminal courts cannot award restitution 
for unliquidated damages involving compensation for pain and suffer-
iIig, or for lost future earning capacity.3 Crime victims must initiate a 
civil suit at their own expense to obtain a civil judgment for unliquidated 
damages, and then must attempt on their own to force a criminal, who 
may be violent, to pay these civil damages. 
Our present system for awarding unliquidated damages to crime vic-
tims does not work well. Unliquidated damage issues primarily affect 
victims of personal violence. Considerable evidence exists indicating that 
victims face some obstacles in winning a civil suit, but even greater ones 
in collecting civil awards for unliquidated damages.4 Victims would be 
better off if these issues were handled by criminal courts. Criminal 
restitution frees crime victims from the responsibilities of bringing a 
civil action, but most importantly criminal courts can use probation of-
ficers and the threat of revocation to induce probationers and parolees 
to pay their restitution orders. 
There are two possible solutions. First, civil collection methods could 
be improved to help crime victims. Second, the scope of criminal restitu-
tion could be expanded to encompass the full range of damage issues, 
which is already the practice in many European criminal courts.5 This 
paper will focus on the second approach, but will discuss the first one. 
* Bradford Mank received his Juris Doctorate Degree from the Yale Law School 
and is currently a law clerk for the honorable Justice David Shea of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court. 
1. See Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: Overview 
of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117, 118·24 (1984); Goldstein, Defining the 
Role of the Victim in Criminal Restitution, 52 MISS. L.J. 515, 516-20 (1982). 
2. See Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role 
of Criminal Courts, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 52, 87-89 (1982). 
3. Id. 
4. See notes 32-60 infra and accompanying text. 
5. See Goldstein, supra note I, at 546-47. 
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Most jurisdictions forbid sentencing judges from ordering restitu-
tion for unliquidated damages, but four states clearly permit such 
awards.8 There are two major objections against allowing criminal courts 
to order restitution for unliquidated damages. First, civil courts are bet-
ter suited in several respects than a judge in a summary sentencing 
proceeding to resolve complex damage issues involving a speculative ele-
ment.7 Second, if judges took enough time to settle such questions then 
the summary sentencing hearing would be transformed into a lengthy 
mini-trial.s These two arguments apply in some cases, but not in all. The 
strongest counter argument is the example of the criminal courts in 
several states which have made such awards without undue difficulty. 
Some unliquidated damage issues may be too complex to adjudicate in 
a sentencing hearing, but others are not. 
Even if criminal courts could in some cases determine the extent 
of unliquidated damages, it may not be cost effective. While courts and 
legislatures are concerned with meeting the restitution needs of victims, 
there is also an interest in limiting the burdens placed on the criminal 
justice system.9 Two factors suggest that criminal courts should award 
unliquidated damages at least in some cases. First, while one must 
balance the costs and benefits of awarding certain kinds of damages in 
criminal courts, there should be a presumption in favor of having sen-
tencing judges order restitution unless there are compelling reasons why 
a criminal court should not. In the case of liquidated damages many 
jurisdictions have a statutory presumption in favor of awarding restitu-
tion.10 On average, unliquidated damages are more complex than li-
quidated damages so the presumptions may be somewhat different when 
these two different types of damages are involved. If a criminal court, 
however, can calculate an award for unliquidated damages in a reasonable 
amount of time then the presumption should be to settle the issue at 
sentencing rather than compel a -victim to bring a civil suit. Second, civil 
courts are not meeting the needs of many victims of violent crime. Civil 
courts may be an acceptable alternative to the criminal processs in serv-
ing the restitution interests of victims of white collar crime, but, even 
at best, civil courts are ill-suited for the demanding task of actually col-
lecting damages from violent criminals.u 
6. For the majority position see. e.g .• State v. Stalheim. 275 Or. 683. 552 P.2d 
829 (1976); State v. Jarvis. 146 Vt. 636. 509 A.2d 1005 (1986); for the minority position 
see notes 20-23 infra. 
7. This argument is made in the majority cases in supra note 6. 
8. [d. 
9. See Harland. supra note 2. 
10. See notes 140-43 infra and accompanying text. 
11. See Goldstein. supra note 1. at 532-35 (arguing that civil suits can handle many 
restitution issues involving white-collar crime). The difficulties victims face in collecting 
restitution from violent criminals are discussed in notes 32-60 infra. 
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Some of the practical problems associated with calculating unli-
quidated damages can be reduced by adopting a guidelines approach. 
English courts have experimented successfully with guidelines for deter-
mining injury pain and suffering.I2 A guidelines approach, however, would 
only work with some, but not all kinds of unliquidated damages. The 
emotional pain and suffering implicated in a rape is too complex to reduce 
to a formula. I3 Likewise, damages for lost future earnings involve too 
many individual variations to allow the substitution of a guideline calcula-
tion based on average cases. Some varieties of unliquidated damages 
must be left to civil courts, but in many cases guidelines can permit 
sentencing judges to resolve damage issues in an expeditious manner. 
While guidelines may be able in a number of instances to overcome 
the practical difficulties involved in assessing unliquidated damages, there 
are still constitutional questions about how far criminal courts can ex-
pand into realms traditionally handled by civil courts. The Seventh 
Amendment may mandate that certain types of damages be resolved 
by a civil jury. The Seventh Amendment requires that a civil jury deter-
mine common law Actions that existed in 1791 when the Bill of Rights 
was enacted, but does not apply to equitable remedies. It is uncertain 
whether unliquidated damages for victim restitution are an equitable 
or legal remedy. The historical record is far from clear on these points. 
Further, only minimal due process protections are required at sentenc-
ing hearings. Unliquidated damage issues are so complex that it is possi-
ble they must be decided in a civil hearing. A civil hearing allows full 
discovery, elaborate pleadings, and a jury determination based on com-
munity sentiment about the value of intangible or speculative damages. 
The criminal system is probably unwilling to bear all the costs 
necessary to guarantee every victim full compensation. But criminal and 
civil courts can work together, and perform a better job in helping vic-
tims to win restitution for unliquidated damages at a reasonable cost. 
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
In most jurisdictions criminal courts cannot award damages for pain 
and suffering, or for lost future earning capacity, but a few states allow 
such awards. There is a tension between guaranteeing full victim restitu-
tion, and reducing the burden on sentencing judges in calculating damage 
awards. Many courts and legislatures have sought to justify the current 
limitations on what types of damages may be awarded by criminal courts 
by claiming that civil courts are even better suited to resolving ques-
tions involving unliquidated damages. Other courts, however, have 
pointed out that, whatever theoretical advantages there may be in handl-
12. See notes 121·32 infra and accompanying text. 
13. See gerl£Tally Estrich. Rape. 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986). 
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ing damage questions in civil courts, criminal courts must take steps 
to insure victims actually receive restitution. 
There are two major lines of argument against allowing sentencing 
judges to award restitution for unliquidated damages. First, some courts 
and legislatures have rejected permitting such restitution orders because 
it is too complicated to calculate unliquidated damages in a summary 
sentencing hearing. Congress debated whether to include unliquidated 
damages in The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWP A).14 
Unliquidated damages were excluded because of their complexity. IS "The 
section requires that restitution be 'as fair as possible to the victim 
without unduly complicating or prolonging the sentencing process.' The 
Committee added this provision to prevent sentencing hearings from 
becoming prolonged and complicated trials on the question of damages 
owed the victim."16 
A number of state courts have made a distinction between liquidated 
and unliquidated damages in terms of their respective complexity.17 Li-
quidated damages are relatively easy to measure because they are 
measured by the present cost of tangible goods and services such as 
hospital bills, property value, and lost employment income. While unli-
quidated damages involve predictions about what a person would have 
made in the future but for an injury, or intuitive speculations about in-
tangible pain and suffering. Thus, courts have allowed sentencing judges 
to order restitution for liquidated damages since they are "easily ascer-
tainable," but have barred restitution orders for unliquidated damages. IS 
A second reason given by courts for excluding unliquidated damages 
from the criminal process is that civil courts are better suited to deciding 
damages involving a speculative, or an intangible element. The Vermont 
Supreme Court recently argued in State v. Jarvis, 
It would be inappropriate to allow the trial judge in senten-
cing proceedings to calculate the amount that should be awarded 
for uncertain, unliquidated losses and for pain and suffering. The 
evaluation of such losses is best left to the civil trial judge and 
14. Pub. L. No. 97·291. 96 Stat. 1248 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580) (1982). 
The restitution provisions of the VWP A are contained in § 5 of the Act. 96 Stat. at 1253-55. 
Congress considered but rejected including unliquidated damages in the Act. See Note. 
Restitution in the Criminal Process: Procedures for Fixing the Offender's Liability. 93 YALE 
L.J. 505. 509 n.16 (1984). See 128 CONGo REC. H8207 (daily ed. Sept. 30. 1982) (statement 
of Rep. McCollum) ("This legislation does not intend that restitution become a substitute 
for civil damages."). 
15. [d. 
16. S. REP. No. 532. 97th Congo 2d Sess. 1. reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2515. 2537 (hereinafter SENATE REPORT). 
17. See. e.g .• State v. Fleming. 125 N.H. 238. 243. 480 A.2d 107. 111 (1984) and 
cases cited supra note 7. 
18. [d. 
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to the collective wisdom of civil juries. In the civil context, the 
judge and jury will receive the benefit of pleadings which frame 
the issues, and testimony from witnesses to develop the rele-
vant evidence.19 
59 
The liberal discovery allowed in civil courts is an additional feature that 
favors deciding unliquidated damages in the civil arena. 
A few states permit criminal courts to order restitution for pain and 
suffering, or for lost future earnings. Courts awarding restitution for 
unliquidated damages have been less impressed with arguments about 
the supposed complexity associated with calculating unliquidated 
damages, and more concerned about insuring full victim compensation. 
Courts holding the minority position have raised the point that civil 
courts are not always able to enforce their awards. The states of Arizona, 
Louisiana, Nebraska, and Washington clearly allow criminal courts to 
award unliquidated damages for pain and suffering.20 The Louisiana courts 
have upheld an award for lost future earnings.21 Lower courts in Penn-
sylvania and New York have sanctioned restitution for pain and suffer-
ing.22 The State of California allows criminal courts to impose a "restitu-
tion fine" based on the extent of pain and suffering, but this fine is paid 
into a statewide fund for the reimbursement of all victims rather than 
to the specific victim.23 
Some courts have justified awards of unliquidated damages on the 
grounds that they are necessary both to fully compensate the victim, 
and to promote the offender's rehabilitation. Under this theory, an of-
fender's rehabilitation cannot be complete unless he fully compensates 
the victim. The Pennsylvania appellate court upheld an award for emo-
tional pain and suffering in Commonwealth v. Balisteri, 
As the various tort cases demonstrate a person may suffer more 
than just a physical injury to his or her body. The purpose of 
restitution is rehabilitation of the offender by impressing upon 
him or her the loss he or she has caused and that it is his or 
her responsibility to repair that loss as far as it is possible to 
19. 509 A.2d at 1007. 
20. Matter'of Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 147 Ariz. 153, 155, 708 P.2d 1344, 
1346 (Ariz. App. 1985); State v. Garner, 115 Ariz, 579, 581, 566 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Ariz. 
App. 1977); State v. Alleman, 439 So. 2d 418, 419-20 (La. 1983); State v. Spell, 461 So. 
2d 654, 655-58 (La. App. 1984); State v. Behrens, 204 Neb. 785, 786-88, 285 N.W.2d 513, 
514-16 (1979); State v. Barr, 99 Wash.2d 75, 76-79, 658 P.2d 1247, 1247-50 (1983); State 
v. Rogers, 30 Wash. App. 653, 653·55, 638 P.2d 89, 89-91 (1981). 
21. State v. Spell, 461 So. 2d at 656-657 & n.3. 
22. People v. Corey, 130 Misc.2d 228, 228-30,495 N.Y.S.2d 620, 620-22 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. 1985); Commonwealth v. Balisteri, 329 Pa. Super. 148, 478 A.2d 5, 6·10 (1984). 
23. See, e.g., People v. Wyman, 166 Cal. App. 3d 810, 810-13, 212 Cal. Rptr. 668, 
668-71 (1985). 
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do so ... Restitution should be encouraged as both an aid in 
assisting the defendant's rehabilitation and as an aid in compen-
sating the victim ... Applying these principles to the facts of this 
case, damage to the emotional health of a child, can be as damag-
ing, if not more so, than any physical injury. Appellant's con-
duct has caused severe emotional harm to his young victims and 
he must bear the financial expense, as far as feasible, for the 
alleviation of the mental anguish. Anything less would not com-
port with the purpose of restitution.24 
Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Alleman held that 
requiring an offender to pay restitution for pain and suffering was related 
to the criminal justice system's interest in rehabilitation. 
Next, defendant argues that a sentencing judge may not im-
pose the condition of restitution except for a tangible or physical 
loss, as opposed to the mental anguish, apprehension, and an-
noyance suffered by defendant's victims .... Moreover, there is 
no reason to believe that restitution for such harms is any less 
reasonably related to rehabilitation than reparation for bodily 
injury or damage to property.25 
Implicit in all decisions permitting restitution for pain and suffer-
ing, or for lost future earning capacity is the assumption that criminal 
courts are perfectly capable of calculating awards for unliquidated 
damages. The Alleman court argued: 
"There is nothing in this language or in our law which would 
indicate a legislative intent to limit reparation or restitution to 
bodily injury or property damage. In the case of torts, for ex-
ample, the jurisprudence has no difficulty in awarding a pecuniary 
indemnification for mental suffering, when it appears to be real 
and serious."26 
Thus, courts which take the minority position do not accept the proposi-
tion that unliquidated damages are inherently too complex to be resolved 
by a criminal court. Arizona courts, however, have been careful to remark 
that some cases involving unliquidated damages may be better left to 
civil proceedings.27 
Some courts have claimed that victims do not always obtain satisfac-
tion when they sue for unliquidated damages in civil courts, and have 
24. 478 A.2d at 9. 
25. 439 So. 2d at 419-20. 
26. [d. 
27. See, e.g., State v. Garner, 115 Ariz. 579, 580-81, 566 P.2d 1055, 1056-57 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1977). 
1987] SCOPE OF CRIMINAL RESTITUTION 61 
suggested that criminal courts should order restitution for these damages. 
The Louisiana Appellate Court maintained in State v. Spell: 
An additional argument raised by the defendant is that the 
restitution ordered is excessive because the victim has already 
been awarded $225,000 in a civil judgment. With regard to this 
argument, it is significant defendant made no attempt to show 
he had or will pay any of this civil judgment. In fact, the trial 
court noted defendant's previously stated intention not to pay 
this judgment. In any event it appears defendant would be en-
titled to a credit on this civil judgment for whatever amount 
he pays in restitution .... Under these circumstances, the fact the 
victim has obtained a civil judgment, which remains unpaid, does 
not render the amount of restitution excessive.28 
A trial court judge in the State of New York expressed great dissatisfac-
tion with civil remedies for crime victims: 
The more traditional approach has been to tell the victim 
that of course she may be entitled to ... damages but not in 
this forum, she must go and sue civilly - a nicely-sounding 
technicality until the victim does attempt to sue civilly and of 
course very likely finds the civil remedies to be totally inade-
quate.29 
While there are differences between those courts which bar senten-
cing judges from ordering restitution for unliquidated damages and the 
minority of courts which~ allow such awards, there are some areas of 
agreement. Punitive damages are a form of unliquidated damages. There 
is general agreement that punitive damages should not be awarded by 
criminal courts.30 Punitive damages are awarded in civil proceedings as 
a means of deterring intentional torts. In the criminal process, fines, 
probation, and imprisonment serve deterrent purposes. No reason ex-
ists to compensate a victim beyond his total losses in a criminal court 
as a means of deterrence.3! This author agrees that punitive damages 
should be limited to the civil sphere. 
Two major factual assumptions separate courts in the majority and 
minority position. First, whether unliquidated damages are so complex 
that sentencing judges cannot resolve them in a reasonable time period. 
Second, whether civil courts are currently performing well in meeting 
the restitution needs of crime victims. This article will show that civil 
28. 461 So. 2d at 657. 
29. Corey, 130 Misc.2d at 229·30, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 622. 
30. See, e.g., Ex Parte Clare, 456 So. 2d 357, 358 (Ala. 1984); Sprague v. State, 
590 P.2d 410,415 (Alaska 1979); State v. Hunt, 80 N.C. App. 190,341 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1986). 
31. Id. 
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courts are not meeting the needs of crime victims, and will explore ways 
to minimize the problems associated with calculating unliquidated 
damages in a sentencing hearing 
III. COLLECTING DAMAGES 
A. Problems in Civil Courts 
Many victims face serious difficulties in actually collecting civil 
judgments for unliquidated damages. Criminal courts possess greater 
powers than civil courts to compel offenders to pay restitution, although 
collecting money from the typical violent offender is always difficult. 
Criminal courts can, however, at least under certain circumstances, im-
prison a probationer who willfully refuses to meet a criminal restitution 
order. Civil courts are generally barred from imprisoning a person who 
does not pay a civil debt. If criminal courts are better adapted to deal-
ing with violent offenders, one option is to give criminal judges the 
authority to order restitution for unliquidated damages. Another possibili-
ty is to give criminal courts the authority to revoke probation if a pro-
bationer willfully refuses to pay a civil debt connected to the offense. 
Finally, civil courts could do a better job if legislatures gave them greater 
powers to use liens, garnishment powers, or civil contempt authority 
to enforce civil awards for victims of personal violence. All these op-
tions should be considered. 
A victim must overcome several obstacles to win a civil suit for unli-
quidated damages. The first is cost. High transaction costs may prevent 
a victim from suing at all. One study found that only 4.8 per cent of 
victims of personal violence actually sued.32 Crime victims like other civil 
plaintiffs must bear the expense for bringing a civil action. A major study 
of violent crime found that 97 per cent of violent crimes caused injuries 
amounting to a few hundred dollars or less.33 Such small amounts of 
damages make a suit in superior court prohibitively expensive, or im-
possible because there is not enough money in controversy. Small claims 
courts are ill-equipped to collect damages from violent criminals.34 While 
the amount in each case may be small, there are probably thousands 
of cases in which victims may not sue for unliquidated damages because 
the cost of a civil suit is too high. 
Many courts and legislatures have assumed that excluding unli-
quidated damages from criminal sentencing does not hurt victims because 
they can use the criminal conviction to collaterally estop the offender 
from denying his liability in a subsequent civil suit. In 1982, Congress 
32. See Gittler, supra note 1, at 138 n.72 (study of 167 victims of personal violence). 
33. Harland, Compensating the Victims of Crime, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 203, 210-11 
(1978). 
34. Id. 
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for the first time gave victims statutory authority to use a criminal con-
viction for collateral estoppel purposes in subsequent civil suits.35 Many 
circuits, however, had already implemented this policy so it was less 
of an innovation than it might have appeared. The Senate Report ac-
companying the VWP A confidently asserts the proposition that collateral 
estoppel will allow victims to collect unliquidated damages. 
Subsection (b)(3) provides that conviction of an offense that 
would properly give rise to restitution shall estop a defendant 
from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in 
any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the victim. It is the 
Committee's intention in this subsection that a criminal convic-
tion obviate a victim's need to establish a defendant's liability 
in a civil suit for punitive and/or compensatory damages.36 
Of course, collateral estoppel will not help a victim if the defendant is 
never convicted, but neither could a criminal court issue restitution 
without a conviction. Collateral estoppel can help many victims with ob-
taining damages in a subsequent civil suit, but collateral estoppel does 
not guarantee a victim's success in civil proceedings. 
There are two important components to every civil suit. First, plain-
tiffs must establish the defendant's liability. Second, plaintiffs must show 
the extent of their damages. The effectiveness of collateral estoppel can 
be undermined by the practice of charge bargaining or undercharging. 
A significant percentage of prosecutors and judges will permit a defen-
dant to plead guilty to a lesser charge rather than take the time and 
expense to prove the defendant committed the "real" offense at a jury 
trial.37 Charge bargaining hinders a victim both from establishing an of-
fender's true liability, and, therefore, interferes with the ability of the 
victim to show the extent of unliquidated damages. For example, if a 
defendant pleads guilty to second-degree sexual assault when he actu-
ally committed a rape then the value of the conviction in helping a vic-
tim win damages for pain and suffering will be diminished. Since it is 
likely that a civil jury will award more damages for pain and suffering 
if a rape is proved, the victim may still have the burden of proving 
the defendant's liability for the real offense. The problem of undercharg-
35. For cases holding that a civil plaintiff can use a criminal conviction to estop 
a defendant from denying liability see, e.g. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 
340 U.S. 558, 568 (1951); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 610 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Lloyd 
v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1187-90 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1978); McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Corp., 532 F.2d 69, 
76 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); Cardillo v. Zyla, 486 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1973). 
36. 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2538 (SENATE REPORT). 
37. See generally, Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. 
REV. 652, 652-730 (1981). 
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ing could be largely eliminated if judges were required to find that the 
conviction offense matches the real offense before they accept a guilty 
plea, but until such reforms are implemented the value of collateral estop-
pel in helping victims win civil suits will be reduced.38 
Even if collateral estoppel is effective in establishing an offender's 
liability, and the conviction offense equals the real offense, the victim 
still must prove the extent of his damages. Convictions seldom help a 
victim prove the extent of their damages. According to Professor 
Harland, "In fact, a finding of guilt in criminal court is rarely helpful 
in assessing the amount of loss or injury in the crime, since precision 
in determining the amount involved is usually unnecessary to a finding 
of guilt."39 In criminal courts damage issues are left to the sentenc-
ing/restitution hearing. Several circuit courts have held that a victim 
cannot collaterally estop a judge's findings in the sentencing hearing 
about damages because the Seventh Amendment requires that the jury 
must be free to determine damages in a subsequent civil suit.40 In any 
case, a sentencing judge would be unlikely to address issues related to 
the amount of unliquidated damages. Thus, a victim has the complete 
burden in a subsequent civil suit for showing the extent of unliquidated 
damages. A criminal conviction does not in itself guarantee that a civil 
jury will find that a victim suffered unliquidated damages. For instance, 
a jury might find in an assault case that a victim experienced no pain 
and suffering. There is always an element of uncertainty about whether 
a jury will award a significant amount of unliquidated damages, and the 
risk associated with bringing any civil suit may discourage many crime 
victims from instituting a civil suit for unliquidated damages at their 
own expense. 
Victims face considerable problems in actually collecting civil 
judgments from criminals. Civil remedies are more likely to work against 
the typical white-collar offender, who usually comes from a middle-class 
background and probably has some assets, than against the average 
violent offender, who is often poor, a minority, and a teenager.41 The 
poverty of many violent offenders is an enormous stumbling block that 
limits the effectiveness of restitution awards either by criminal or civil 
courts. 
While both civil and criminal courts face serious problems in attempt-
ing to collect restitution from violent offenders, criminal courts general-
38. Professor Goldstein has made a compelling argument that the conviction of-
fense must be required to equal the real offense if the criminal justice system is to main-
tain an aura of integrity. See A. GOLDSTEIN. THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY 43-47 (1981). 
39. Harland, supra note 2, at 98-99. 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 479-80 (3d Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 
827, 838 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985). 
41. See Harland, supra note 33, at 218-20, and supra note 11. 
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ly enjoy greater powers than civil courts to force violent criminals to 
pay. "Nevertheless, use of the criminal court as a more powerful en-
forcer than its civil counterpart is manifest."'2 Especially significant is 
the ability of criminal courts to revoke probation or parole if an offender 
willfully refuses to pay restitution. Criminal courts can even require that 
a probationer actively seek employment, and, as a result, can greatly 
increase the likelihood that the offender will have enough money to pay 
the restitution award.'3 There are, however, constitutional limitations 
on the ability of crimin'al courts to revoke parole or probation if the 
offender fails to pay his restitution obligation. The Supreme Court in 
Bearden v. Georgia held that a court or parole board cannot revoke a 
probationer's or parolee's status for failure to pay restitution if his pov-
erty makes him unable to pay." After Bearden, a court can still revoke 
probation or parole if it finds that the offender has willfully failed to 
pay restitution.'5 Of course, what constitutes "willfull" behavior is a com-
plex question that can only be decided given the particular facts in a case. 
B. Using Criminal Courts to Enforce Civil Judgments 
Even if one accepts the argument that criminal courts are superior 
to civil courts at collecting restitution, one could still maintain that civil 
courts are the best forum in which to determine the amount of unli-
quidated damages, and that criminal courts should be limited to the task 
of enforcing such judgments. Criminal courts could use their revocation 
powers to pressure an offender to pay his civil restitution debt to the 
victim. Most probation and parole statutes, however, do not give courts 
or parole boards authority to enforce civil judgments.'8 Most criminal 
courts have not addressed this issue because they clearly lack jurisdic-
tion to intervene in a civil case.'7 A few cases have held that a criminal 
court can, at least indirectly, make payment of a civil judgment a condi-
tion of probation.'s Most cases, however, have rejected giving criminal 
42. See Harland. supra note 2. at 113 n.344. 
43. See, e.g., Bass v. State, 473 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); People v. 
Wells, 90 Ill. App. 320, 413 N.E. 2d 218 (1980); State v. Coffey, 74 N.C. App. 137, 327 
SE.2d 606 (1985) (all involving probation revocation when probationer failed to seek employ-
ment!. See generally Mank, Post-Sentence Sentencing: Determining Probation Revocation 
Sanctions, 18 Cumbo L. Rev. 437 (1988) (judges have broad discretion to revoke probation). 
44. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
45. [d. 
46. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-603 (1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 907 (West 
1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31·17 (1981). 
47. See, e.g., Shew v. Southern Fire & Cas. Co., 298 S.E.2d 380, 383 (1983). (Court 
lacks jurisdiction to revoke probation over a civil debt!. 
48. Gross v. United States, 228 F.2d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1956); People v. McClean, 
130 Cal. App. 2d 439, 444·45, 279 P.2d 87, 91 (1955); People v. D'Elia, 73 Cal. App. 2d 
764, 769, 167 P.2d 253, 255 (1946). 
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courts a role in enforcing civil debts!9 
There has been strong opposition among many criminal courts against 
making them into a debt collection agency. The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
declared in State v. Scherr, "Neither should the criminal process be used 
to supplement a civil suit or as a threat to coerce the payment of a 
civil liability and thus reduce the criminal court to a collection agency."50 
The Michigan Court of Appeals proclaimed in People v. Moore, "If one 
makes use of the criminal law for some collateral or private purpose, 
such as to compel the delivery of property or payment of a debt rather 
than to vindicate the law, he is guilty of a misuse of process, and a 
fraud upon the law."51 
Revoking an offender's parole or probation status for a civil debt 
strikes some courts as tantamount to the hoary and discredited practice 
of imprisonment for debt. 52 Other courts have distinguished between civil 
debts, and collecting criminal restitution.53 Many states have constitu-
tional provisions against imprisonment for debt.54 A number of courts 
have argued that criminal restitution does not establish a debtor-creditor 
relationship between the offender and victim, but instead aids in an of-
fender's rehabilitation.55 Therefore, according to the analysis of these 
courts revocation is permissible when the probationer fails to pay restitu-
tion, because the failure to pay shows the offender has failed to achieve 
rehabilitative progress.56 A small number of judges have argued that 
revoking probation because the proba,tioner fails to pay restitution is 
constitutionally impermissible since it is tantamount to imprisonment for 
debt. The Arizona Court of Appeals declared in State v. Garner: "Great 
49. See Harland, supra note 2, at 54-55 n.13, and infra notes 50-58. 
50. 9 Wis. 2d 418, 424, 101 N.W.2d 77, 80 (1960). 
51. 43 Mich. App. 693, 697, 204 N.W.2d 737, 739 (1972) (quoting Hall v. American 
Inv. Co., 241 Mich. 341. 353. 217 N.W.2d 18, 20 (1928)). 
52. See. e.g .• State v. Caudle. 276 N.C. 550. 555. 173 S.E.2d 778, 782 (1970) ("To 
suspend a sentence of imprisonment for a criminal act. however just the sentence may 
be per se, on condition that the defendant pay obligations unrelated to such criminal act. 
however just owing. is a use of the criminal to enforce the payment of a civil obliga-
tion .... "); Ex parte Trombley. 31 Cal. 2d 801. 804. 193 P.2d 734. 737 (1948) ("Although 
by its terms the prohibition is directed to imprisionment in civil actions, it has been held 
to apply in a criminal proceeding .... The courts will not permit the purposes of the con-
stitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt to be circumvented by mere 
form ... "). 
53. Maurier v. State. 112 Ga. App. 297, 298, 144 S.E.2d 918. 919 (1965) (restitution 
as condition of probation is not violative of state constitution providing there shall be 
no imprisonment for debt; People v. Mosesson, 78 Misc.2d 217, 218. 356 N.Y.S.2d 483, 
484 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (restitution condition of probation does not create a debt nor 
a debtor/creditor relationship between persons making and receiving probation). 
54. See Harland, supra note 2, at 113 n. 342. 
55. See note 53 supra. 
56. [d. 
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constitutional problems develop if the amount of reparations is an amount 
larger than the defendant can pay. When this occurs, and the defendant 
is later incarcerated for his failure to pay, we have what may be termed 
an imprisonment for debt problem."57 It is unclear whether the limita· 
tions on revocation for failure to pay restitution contained in Bearden 
eliminate the imprisonment for debt problem. 
Similarly, a dissenting judge on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
argued, "If the appellant is unable to make the required restitution 
payments, and as a result his probation is revoked, will he not have 
been imprisoned for debt, contrary to the prohibition of Art. 1, Section 
18, Texas Constitution?"58 
In those jurisdictions in which a criminal court is not constitutionally 
barred from assisting victims in the enforcement of civil judgments, 
legislatures should encourage this practice. In addition legislatures should 
expand the collection powers of civil courts as a means to insure that 
victims actually collect the monies they win in a judgment. 
There are strong reasons, however, for favoring criminal courts as 
the forum in which to both calculate and collect unliquidated damage 
awards, unless they are very complex. The constitutional problem raised 
when a criminal court revokes probation and incarcerates a probationer 
as a.result of his failure to pay a civil debt can be avoided if the sentenc-
ing court orders restitution for the entire range of damages. In addi-
tion, it is inefficient to have civil courts determine restitution awards, 
and then to require criminal courts to enforce them. Criminal courts 
do not have the authority to revoke probation if a probationer fails to 
pay a civil debt unrelated to the offense for which he was sentenced.59 
To justify a revocation order based on a probationer's failure to pay 
a civil debt, a criminal court must provide written findings of fact that 
establish a clear connection between the debt and conviction.5O To revoke 
prohation for a civil debt, a criminal court essentially must redetermine 
the basis for the award; thereby, duplicating the work of the civil court. 
Thus, if a criminal court must enforce an award for unliquidated damages, 
it probably should calculate that award in the first place. 
IV. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
A. The Line Between Civil and Criminal 
Civil courts have traditionally awarded damages for pain and suf· 
fering, and for lost future earning capacity. The Seventh Amendment 
57. 115 Ariz. at 581. 566 P.2d at 1057. 
58. Flores v. State, 513 S.W.2d 66, 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
59. See note 52 supra. 
60. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 53642 (reviewing cases discussing whether restitu· 
tion is limited by the offense of conviction or the real offense behavior). 
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preserves a defendant's right to a civil jury trial for common law ac-
tions that existed when the Bill of Rights was enacted in 1791. If Con-
gress passed a statute permitting federal sentencing judges to order 
restitution for unliquidated damages, defendants would challenge the con-
stitutionality of the statute on the ground that such awards violate their 
Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial. A Seventh Amendment 
attack, however, would not apply to state courts because the right to 
a civil jury trial has never been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a fundamental right.61 Most violent crimes are common law of-
fenses under state jurisdiction. Only a small percentage of all federal 
. crimes involve personal violence. Whether criminal courts should award 
unliquidated damages is mainly a state rather than a federal question; 
nonetheless, the Seventh Amendment issue presents interesting intellec-
tual problems. 
The Seventh Amendment states, "In suits at common law ... the right 
of trial shall be preserved." There are two main ways to show that the 
Seventh Amendment does not prohibit sentencing judges from ordering 
restitution for unliquidated damages. First, one can demonstrate that 
criminal courts in 1791 had the authority to award unliquidated damages. 
While criminal courts in 1791 did not award restitution for pain and 
suffering, or for lost future earnings, they could award restitution for 
other kinds of unliquidated damages. The question is whether Congress 
can expand criminal restitution into new areas without violating the 
Seventh Amendment. Also, if civil courts in 1791 had exclusive authori-
ty to award unliquidated damages, were these civil remedies equitable 
or legal in nature? The Seventh Amendment only applies to common 
law remedies, but does not affect equitable action. If unliquidated 
damages for victim restitution are an equitable remedy the Seventh 
Amendment does not apply. 
It is well established what kinds of damages criminal courts did 
award as restitution in 1791, but the present implications of these 
historical facts are not so clear. In the late eighteenth century English 
and American criminal courts awarded restitution only for the value of 
stolen property.62 Some American states during the colonial period and 
in the early days of the Republic allowed a criminal court to order a 
larcenist to pay the victim double or triple the value of the stolen goods 
in restitution, which seems to be the same as a civil award for punitive 
damages.63 Criminal courts in 1791 did not award restitution for many 
61. See, e.g., Letendre v. Fugate, 701 F.2d 1093, 1094 (4th Cir. 1983). 
62. See United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing 4 W. 
BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES 362-63); United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 801 (7th Cir. 
1985); Laster, Criminal Restitution: A SUTlJey of Its Past History and an Analysis of its 
Present Usefulness, 5 RICHMOND L. REV. 71, 76 (1970). 
63. See Jacob, Reparation or Restitution by the Criminal Offender to His Victim: 
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types of liquidated damages such as medical expenses, lost wages, or 
funeral expenses.54 On the other hand, in larceny cases criminal courts 
did award a form of punitive damages, which falls into the unliquidated 
ca te gory. 65 
In 1791 there was no distinction between civil and criminal restitu-
tion based on a division between liquidated and unliquidated damages. 
Today many jurisdictions allow criminal courts to order restitution for 
all varieties of liquidated damages, but exclude all types of unliquidated 
damages, although a minority of states allow sentencing judges to award 
at least some kinds of unliquidated damages. Some courts have argued 
that unliquidated damages should be awarded by a civil rather than a 
criminal court, but this separation may be a modern development rather 
than a reflection of what took place in 1791. Criminal courts in 1791 
did not award many types of liquidated damages that are now commonly 
part of criminal restitution orders, yet criminal courts in some states 
did award a form of punitive damages, a type of unliquidated damages 
which almost all jurisdictions now exclude from criminal sentencing.66 
There may be good policy reasons for excluding unliquidated damages 
from sentencing proceedings, but history controls what the Seventh 
Amendment means. . 
A central issue is how far can legislatures expand the scope of 
criminal restitution beyond what existed in 1791. Defendants have raised 
Seventh Amendment challenges against the VWP A on the theory that 
the Act allows sentencing judges to award several kinds of liquidated 
damages which in 1791 only civil courts could decide. These damages 
include medical expenses, lost earnings, and funeral expenses.67 Several 
circuit courts have upheld the VWPA's constitutionality against Seventh 
Amendment attacks on the ground that Congress can expand the range 
of damages in criminal restitution beyond those allowed in 1791.68 The 
question is whether the same reasoning about enlarging the scope of 
criminal restitution beyond the limits that existed in 1791 applies to unli-
quidated damages for pain and suffering, and for lost future earning 
capacity. The reasoning in two circuit cases suggests that Congress could 
broaden criminal restitution to incorporate unliquidated damages without 
violating the Seventh Amendment, but dicta in two other circuit court 
decisions take the opposite view. 
Two decisions by the Second and the Seventh Circuits have empha-
sized the ability of Congress to expand the spectrum of restitution 
Applicability of an Ancient Concept in the Modern Correctional Process. 61 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 152. 155 (1970); Harland. supra note 2. at 57 n. 30. 
64. See note 62 supra. 
65. See note 63 supra. 
66. See notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text. 
67. See note 62 supra. 
68. See notes 69·70 infra. 
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beyond what existed in 1791. Judge Newman argued in United States 
v. Brown, 
Finally, we note that judicially ordered restitution comports 
with the common law practice at the time the Seventh Amend-
ment was adopted. Common law judges awarded restitution in 
larceny cases, thereby sparing victims the need to pursue civil 
remedies. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *362-63. Congress 
has ample power to build on this historic practice and authorize 
judges to order restitution for the full range of injuries suffered 
by crime victims. The Seventh Amendment is no barrier to this 
addition to the arsenal of federal criminal sanctions.69 
The opinion does not specifically address the issue of allowing unli-
quidated damages in criminal restitution, but damages for pain and suf-
fering, and lost future earnings are clearly part of "the full range of 
injuries suffered by crime victims." The reasoning in Judge Newman's 
opinion can be used to support the idea of allowing federal sentencing 
judges to award restitution for unliquidated damages. 
Judge Posner's opinion in United States v. Fountain also emphasized 
the ability of Congress to build on historical precedent, and expand the 
range of criminal restitution beyond that permitted in 1791. 
That forms of criminal restitution other than ordering stolen 
goods restored to the owner do not have so clear an historical 
pedigree does not matter. What matters is that criminal restitu-
tion is not some newfangled effort to get around the Seventh 
Amendment but a traditional criminal remedy; its precise con-
tours can change through time without violating the Seventh 
Amendment.7o 
Judge Posner suggested that restitution for lost future earnings could 
fit within the domain of criminal punishment. "There is, indeed, no dif-
ference of principle between past and future earnings, so far as the pur-
poses of criminal punishment are concerned."71 His opinion apparently 
accepted the constitutionality of restitution orders for lost future earn-
ings, but rejected these awards under most circumstances for the prac-
tical reason that they are usually too complex to resolve in a sentencing 
hearing.72 He explicitly stated that judges in the Seventh Circuit may 
award restitution for lost future earnings if the defendant does not 
dispute the amount involved. 
69. 744 F.2d at 910. 
70. 768 F.2d at 801. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. 
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This does not make the statute unconstitutional, however, 
or entitle the defendants to a jury trial on the issue of the restitu-
tion of their victims' lost future earnings. "Future" is not in the 
statute. Obeying the statutory directive that "the imposition of 
such ... not unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing pro-
cess," 18 U.S.C. § 3579(d), we hold that an order requiring a 
calculation of lost future earnings unduly complicates the sentenc-
ing process and hence is not authorized by the Victim and 
Witness Protection Act-unless, to repeat a vital qualification, 
the amount is uncontested, so that no calculation is required. 73 
71 
Two other circuit court opinions have suggested that the Seventh 
Amendment bars sentencing judges from awarding unliquidated damages. 
These two courts come to a different conclusion about the validity of 
awarding unliquidated damages in criminal restitution probably because 
they used a different reasoning process to uphold the constitutionality 
of the VWP A than the Brown or Fountain courts employed. Neither 
the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Satterfield nor the Ninth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Keith addressed the Seventh Amendment attack 
on the VWP A in terms of what kinds of damages criminal courts could 
award in 1791, or in view of what historical precedent suggests about 
the constitutional limits of criminal restitution, which is a serious 
weakness considering that the Seventh Amendment is defined by what 
existed in 1791,14 Both the Satterfield and Keith courts made the rather 
circular argument that restitution under the VWP A does not violate the 
Seventh Amendment because Congress intended that such restitution 
constitutes a criminal penalty rather than a civil judgment. The Satter-
field court argued, 
The characterization of a penalty as civil or criminal is a ques-
tion of legislative intent. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 
248, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). In drafting the 
restitution provisions of the VWP A, Congress made clear in both 
the language of the statute and its accompanying legislative 
history that victim restitution would be imposed as a criminal, 
rather than civil, penalty.75 
N either the Satterfield nor the Keith courts examined the fundamental 
question of whether the Seventh Amendment places limits on what types 
of restitution or criminal penalties in general that criminal courts may 
impose regardless of what Congress intends. 
73. Id .• at 802. 
74. See. e.g .• United States v. Keith. 754 F.2d 1388. 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Satterfield. 743 F.2d 827. 836-37 (11th Cir. 1984). cert. denied. 471 U.S. 1117 (1985). 
75. 743 F.2d at 836. 
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There is a fundamental contradiction in the analysis by the Keith 
and Satterfield courts. Both argue that Congressional intent determines 
whether a penalty is civil or criminal, yet each opinion assumes that 
unliquidated damages are inherently civil in nature.76 Congress could 
declare pain and suffering to be a criminal penalty, and authorize sen-
tencing judges to order such damages in restitution. The Keith court 
tried to make a distinction between restitution under the VWPA, which 
is defined as a criminal penalty, and unliquidated damages, which are 
civil damages. "Unlike an award of damages in a civil action, a restitu-
tion order under the Act may compensate only for the kind of harms 
enumerated in subsection 3579(b) (excluding, for example, pain and suf-
fering)."77 
The Satterfield court took a similar position. "The types of losses 
recoverable under the VWP A also distinguish its restitution provisions 
from civil judgments. Whereas under the Act, speculative damages such 
as pain and suffering ... may not be recovered, such damages are fre-
quently sought in civil actions."78 The last portion of the Satterfwld court's 
argument is illogical because all of the types of damages included in 
the VWP A are also "frequently sought in civil actions." 
There may be good reasons why liquidated damages may be criminal 
penalties while unliquidated damages must be civil damages, but neither 
the Keith nor the Satterfield opinions explain why this distinction is 
necessary. It may be that speculative, unliquidated damages ought to 
remain in the civil sphere because of the greater discovery opportunities 
and time available in a civil proceeding, but that is a policy argument 
rather than a constitutional one. In 1791 criminal courts did not award 
damages for either medical expenses, or pain and suffering. If Congress 
can expand criminal restitution to include a wider variety of liquidated 
damages, it possibly could do the same with liquidated damages. The 
reasoning in Brown and Fountain suggests that Congress can expand 
criminal restitution to encompass the full range of victim injuries in-
cluding unliquidated damages. Despite the dicta in these opinions, the 
rationale in both Satterfield and Keith is that Congress enjoys broad 
power to define what are criminal penalties, and what are civil penalties. 
Thus, the arguments in both Satterfield and Keith can be turned around 
to support the thesis that Congress is free to declare that unliquidated 
damages are criminal penalties, not civil ones. 
Some people may be troubled by the notion raised in the preceding 
paragraph that Congress may be completely free to assign hitherto civil 
matters to criminal courts. If the Seventh Amendment means anything 
76. See note 74 supra, and notes 77-78 infra. 
77. 754 F.2d at 1391. 
78. 743 F.2d at 837 n.7. 
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there must be some limits on the authority of Congress to define what 
is civil, and what is criminal. A way exists to distinguish criminal restitu-
tion from civil damages even if sentencing judges can award the full 
range of damages to victims. Unlike civil courts, sentencing judges must 
consider a defendant's ability to pay before a restitution order is 
entered.79 Criminal restitution serves the dual goals of compensating the 
victim, and of rehabilitating the offender by requiring him to take respon-
sibility for the damage he has caused.so A number of courts have held 
that restitution orders should be limited to what an offender can 
reasonably be expected to pay since excessive restitution demands can 
harm the offender's ability to support his family, and thereby hurt his 
rehabilitative development.s1 Whether offenders are truly rehabilitated 
by the process of compensating victims for their losses is a debatable 
point, but the rehabilitative element in criminal restitution distinguishes 
it from civil damages. 
If sentencing judges consider a defendant's ability to pay when they 
make restitution orders that alone may be enough to defeat any Seventh 
Amendment challenge.s2 Judges in "suits at common law" do not take 
into account a defendant's financial resources when they compute 
damages, but criminal restitution awards do take into account this fac-
tor. Judge Newman used this argument in Brown to show that criminal 
restitution is unlike civil damages, and thus not within the province of 
the Seventh Amendment. 
Furthermore, though the VWP A was intended to compen-
sate the victim, it does so in a manner distinct from the normal 
functioning of a civil adjudication. A court imposing an order 
of restitution is required to consider the defendant's ability to 
pay. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(aj. The victim may therefore be awarded 
less than full compensation solely due to the offender's financial 
circumstances.83 
As long as they consider the defendant's ability to pay, sentencing judges 
may be able to award any type of damages including unliquidated 
damages without violating the Seventh Amendment. 
79. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (1982); State v. Dillon, 292 Or. 172, 177, 637 P.2d 
602, 607 (1981). 
80. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.12(5) (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31·17·l(D) 
(1986). 
81. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17·A, § 1325(2)(D) (1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, 
§ 991a(A)(I)(a) (1986); Hugget v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 803, 266 N.W.2d 403, 409 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1978). 
82. United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905 at 910. 
83. [d. 
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Three major arguments can be made about why the Seventh Amend-
ment should not prohibit sentencing judges from ordering restitution 
for unliquidated damages. First, there is the argument in both Brown 
and Fountain that Congress can build on historical precedent, and ex-
pand the range of damages awarded in restitution. Second, one can use 
the reasoning in Keith and in Satterfield to argue that Congress has great 
power to define what is a criminal as opposed to a civil penalty, and, 
thus, Congress could define unliquidated damages as a criminal penalty. 
Both the first and second arguments share a common weakness. The 
Seventh Amendment may impose some limits on the extent to which 
Congress can define an issue as criminal or civil. The third argument 
is stronger. If judges consider a defendant's ability to pay when they 
assess criminal restitution they are acting in a fundamentally different 
manner than a civil court. An order of restitution that takes into ac-
count an offender's financial resources is not the same as a civil award 
that does not consider the defendant's means. Yet even the third argu-
ment might not convince those courts that apparently believe that unli-
quidated damages are somehow inherently civil in nature.84 
B. Equity vs. Common Law 
Assume that unliquidated damages are intrinsically civil in nature. 
It may still be possible to award such "civil" damages in a criminal pro-
ceeding because the Seventh Amendment only requires a civil jury trial 
for common law actions existing in 1791. The Seventh Amendment does 
not apply to civil actions traditionally decided by a chancellor sitting 
in equity. Judge Posner has argued that criminal restitution is equitable 
in nature. 
Restitution is frequently an equitable remedy, meaning, of course, 
that there is no right of jury trial. ... The Supreme Court has 
suggested that restitution of back pay under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 is an equitable remedy not requiring 
a jury. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 
1009, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974). The same, it seems to us, is true 
of restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 
1982.85 
There is no case law on the point of whether restitution for unli-
quidated damages is an equitable or legal remedy. Awards for money 
damages can be equitable, although the classic equitable remedy is in-
junctive relief.88 Restitution can arise under a number of circumstances 
84. See notes 77·78 supra. 
85. Fountain, 768 F.2d at 801. 
86. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974). 
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in the civil context, and, indeed, an entire restatement is . devoted to 
the problems of civil restitution.87 Most civil restitution actions are con-
sidered to be equitable, but some are classified as legal ones.88 The Sixth 
Circuit in a recent case declared, "Historically, an action for restitution 
seeks an equitable remedy for which there is no Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial."89 On the other hand, Judge Easterbrook has 
disputed the common wisdom that restitution actions are equitable in 
nature. 
The full picture is more complex. Remedies known as "restitu-
tion" were available in courts of law and equity alike before their 
merger, and terms such as "restitution" and "unjust enrichment" 
have slowly changed from distinctive forms of action to measures 
of damages available in actions of all sorts .... The evolution of 
the legal terms, coupled with the merger of the court systems, 
makes it difficult to say when a request for "restitution" or "con-
structive trust" is distinctively legal and when it is distinctively 
equitable-if these distinctions any longer have meaning for 
remedies measured solely in money.90 
There is no clear answer about whether unliquidated damages are 
equitable or legal in nature if they are awarded as restitution to a crime 
victim. Whether the Seventh Amendment bars sentencing judges from 
ordering restitution for unliquidated damages remains an open question. 
V. DUE PROCESS 
The Seventh Amendment does not apply to state courts, but restitu-
tion awards in both state and federal courts must meet the Fifth or 
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements. When judges 
or juries evaluate claims for pain and suffering there is an intuitive or 
intangible element in their calculations. Any indefiniteness involved in 
assessing unliquidated damages raises serious constitutional questions 
about whether sentencing judges can apply rational standards, or 
whether such awards necessarily involve so much caprice on the part 
of the judge that due process cannot be achieved. The complexity 
associated with calculating damages for lost future earnings may render 
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION (1983). 
88. See, e.g. In re Evangelist, 760 F.2d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1985); Securities & Exchange 
Commission v. Commonwealth Chemical Securities, Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 999, 1006 ( S.D.N.Y. 
1980) (all shareholder derivative actions). 
89. Crews v. Central States, S.E. and S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332, 
338 (6th Cir. 1986) (refund of contributions to a pension fund). 
90. First Nat'l Bank of Waukesha v. Warren, 796 F.2d 999, 1000 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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a summary sentencing proceeding to be a constitutionally inadequate 
forum. 
Before examining the specific issue of what amount of due process 
is demanded when a determination is made about unliquidated damages, 
it will be useful to review the general due process protections that must 
be afforded to a defendant in a sentencing hearing. A criminal defend-
ant is entitled to some degree of due process at a sentencing hearing.91 
The same degree of due process protection, however, need not be pro-
vided during the sentencing hearing as would be required at a triaP2 
Only minimal due process is required at sentencing.93 "The sole interest 
being protected is the right not to be sentenced on the basis of invalid 
premises or inaccurate information."94 
Due process demands that a restitution statute contain "sufficient· 
safeguards to ensure that a sentencing judge, exercising appropriate 
discretion, will award restitution based on accurate facts and premises."95 
To decide whether a defendant has received adequate due process when 
a sentencing judge awards restitution, courts have focused on the degree 
to which a defendant has a reasonable opportunity to challenge the ac-
curacy of a victim's claims. "Due process assures the defendant he will 
be given adequate notice and opportunity to contest the facts relied upon 
to support his criminal penalty."96 If the defendant disputes the amount 
of restitution at stake, the sentencing judge must make factual findings 
supporting his restitution order. "The defendant facing restitution is fur-
ther protected by Rule 32(c)(3)(D), which requires the trial court to make 
a factual finding on the record if the defendant challenges the accuracy 
of the information contained in the presentence report and relied upon 
by the sentencing judge."97 Obviously Rule 32 (c)(3)(D) applies only to 
federal courts, but state courts have similar protections.98 
There are additional process issues implicated in criminal restitu-
tion. The government bears the burden of persuasion in showing the 
extent of the victim's injuries.99 The VWPA obligates the government 
to meet its burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence, 
but some states apply the lesser burden of "reasonable certainty."loo In 
91. See Shelton v. United States. 497 F.2d 156. 159 (5th Cir. 1974). 
92. See. e.g .• United States v. Stephens. 699 F.2d 534. 537 (11th Cir. 1983). 





98. See. e.g .• N.C. GEN. STAT. S 148-57.l(a)..(b) (1978); State v. Harris. 70 N.J. 586. 
362 A.2d 32 (1976) (written statement justifying restitution order). 
99. See. e.g .• 18 U.S.C. S 3580(d) (1982). 
100. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3580(d) (1982) with State v. Harris. 70 N.J. 586. 598. 362 
A.2d 32. 38 (1976) (restitution "need not be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 
qua evidence."). 
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some ways a defendant at a sentencing hearing has fewer rights than 
he would at a civil proceeding. The technical rules of evidence do not 
apply in most jurisdictions at the sentencing hearing, and in some states 
sentencing judges do not have to decide issues based on a preponderance 
of the evidence, but can employ a lesser standard.lol A defendant in many 
jurisdictions does not have full access to the presentence investigation 
(PSI) prepared by a probation officer, and may not obtain complete in-
formation about the victim's restitution demands until shortly before the 
restitution hearing. lo2 
The procedures which are generally employed when judges make 
restitution awards for liquidated damages may not be sufficient to satisfy 
due process requirements when unliquidated damages are at stake. The 
four states allowing sentencing judges to order restitution for unli-
quidated damages (Arizona, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Washington) do 
not require special procedures. Arizona decisions suggest, however, that 
judges in sentencing courts who make such awards, and appellate courts 
when they review them must be specially carefut.t°3 On the other hand, 
courts might hold that due process demands that speculative damages 
must be awarded in a civil proceeding with elaborate pleadings, full 
discovery, and the opportunity for a jury decision. lo4 Those courts which 
have argued that civil proceedings are better suited to awarding 
speculative damages, however, have all based their decisions on policy 
grounds or statutory interpretation rather than by invoking due process. 
Probably the leading or most widely cited opinion against allowing 
unliquidated damages in the criminal process is the Oregon Supreme 
Court's decision in State v. Stalheim. I05 The Stalheim court made a number 
of policy arguments to support its decision, which are summarized in 
the preceeding paragraph, and based its holding on its reading of the 
relevant Oregon statute.106 The Stalheim court did not, however, raise 
the issue that awards for unliquidated damages might be unconstitu-
tional. In fact, the Stalheim opinion suggested that the legislature has 
the power to decide both civil and criminal liability in one trial. 
"A part of the difficulties might be avoided if criminal and civil 
liability could both be resolved at one trial as is done in many 
101. See, e.g., People v. Tidwell, 33 Ill. App. 3d 232, 237, 338 N.E.2d 113, 117 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1975). 
102. See Fennel & Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis 
of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1615 (1980). 
103. See note 27 supra. 
104. Cj State v. Jarvis, 146 Vt. 636, 509 A.2d 1005, 1006-07 (Vt. 1986) (arguing on 
policy and statutory grounds not on due process). 
105. State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 552 P.2d 829 (1976). 
106. Id. at 686-88, 552 P.2d at 831-32. 
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civil law countries. . .. Such substantial procedural revisions 
should, of course, be made by the legislature."lo7 
Only one case has directly considered the question of whether 
criminal courts are constitutionally competent to resolve questions of 
damages for pain and suffering. The Third District of the California Court 
of Appeals in People v. Wyman upheld a restitution fine based in part 
on the pain and suffering inflicted on two minor victims of lewd and 
lascivious acts. lOB As was noted earlier, under the California statute 
restitution for unliquidated damages is paid into a statewide victim com-
pensation fund rather than directly to the individual victim so there 
might be some differences if the award was given to the victim. The 
Wyman court, however, firmly rejected the defendant's assertion that 
permitting criminal courts to assess unliquidated damages violates due 
process. 
Relying on State v. Stalheim .. . defendant asserts his fine 
represents "unliquidated damages" that were imposed in viola-
tion of due process of law .... To the extent defendant is claim-
ing he was entitled by due process to a hearing other than the 
sentencing hearing he got in connection with the fine imposed 
on him, we reject that contention .... Defendant makes no con-
tention that, in setting the amount of the fine, the trial court 
relied on information to which defendant had no opportunity to 
respond with appropriate affirmative evidence. We conclude 
defendant was afforded adequate due process under both state 
and federal Constitutions when the amount of his restitution fine 
was set at his sentencing hearing. lo9 
The Wyman court indicated that sentencing judges are capable of deter-
mining unliquidated damages as long as the defendant is provided ade-
quate notice and opportunity to contest the damages. 
Another approach to the due process question would be to argue 
that the calculation of speculative damages by a sentencing judge 
necessarily violates due process because there are no standards by which 
to determine the award. In United States v. Welden the district court 
held that the VWPA's restitution procedures violated due process since 
there were no "ascertainable standards'~ set forth in the statute. no 
"'Due process' and 'equal protection' are brother and sister. To 
meet their requirements, a statute must not subject an individual 
107. [d. at 689, 552 P.2d at 833 n.12. 
108. 166 Cal. App. 3d 810, 212 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1985). 
109. [d. at 814·16, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 671·72. 
110. 568 F.Supp. 516, 534 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (emphasis in original). 
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to arbitrary or uneven exercises of power .... The test of 'due pro-
cess' is essentially a test of fairness and reasonableness .... There 
must always be ascertainable standards."lll 
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. The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Satterfield overturned the 
Welden decision, and held that the VWPA contained sufficient procedural 
protections to meet due process requirements.1l2 The Satterfield court, 
however, did indicate that some restitution awards might not meet con-
stitutional standards. "We believe it is possible for a defendant in a par-
ticular case to have his right to a fair sentencing hearing violated by 
the arbitrary imposition of restitution."1l3 
While the Welden court's reasoning has not been accepted in the 
context of the VWP A, courts might find that restitution orders for pain 
and suffering violate due process because of the lack of ascertainable 
standards. Unliquidated damages are by definition those damages which 
are not "easily ascertained."1l4 There is no way to put an exact price 
on pain and suffering without making an arbitrary determination in some 
sense. A number of decisions have suggested that courts may only award 
criminal restitution if it is possible to place a precise figure on the ex-
tent of damages. The Seventh Circuit recently stated in United States 
v. Mischler that "it is equally clear that the amount of restitution must 
be definite."ll5 The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Watchman argued, 
"For the restitution order the court is not dealing with generalities. In 
the dollar determinations there is no discretion of any significant degree. 
The victim has specific monetary losses,"which need to be established."1l6 
It is unclear whether restitution orders for pain and suffering would 
violate due process. Due process requirements might be met if the defen-
dant is given notice and opportunity to contest the amount, and the judge 
supports the order with factual findings. On the other hand, restitution 
for pain and suffering might violate due process if the court finds there 
are no ascertainable standards. There is a way to establish standards 
for determining pain and suffering awards that may overcome due pro-
cess objections. A number of states allow sentencing judges to order 
restitution for wrongful death damages.1l7 These restitution orders for 
wrongful death damages have been able to pass constitutional muster 
because damages are based on the support needs of the surviving fam-
111. Id. 
112. Satterfield. 743 F.2d 827. 827-51. 
113. Id .• 743 F.2d at 840. 
114. State v. Fleming. 125 N.H. 238. 245. 480 A.2d 107. 111 (1984). 
115. 787 F.2d 240. 245 (7th Cir. 1986). 
116. 749 F.2d 616. 619 (10th Cir. 1984). 
117. See. e.g .• IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.12(a)(b) (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
31-17-l{a)(2) (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1986). 
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ily rather than the decedent's future earning capacity. liS In family courts 
guidelines are often employed to calculate how much child and spousal 
support a separated or divorced spouse must pay to his family.l19 Use 
of these support guidelines in the context of restitution awards for 
wrongful death has allowed criminal courts to overcome constitutional . 
attacks on the theory that they are determined in an arbitrary fashion. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals in People v. Wager upheld a restitution 
order for wrongful death actions. 
Further, restitution payments were not set in an arbitrary 
fashion. The $30 per child per week payments ordered by the 
trial court conformed to the Friend of the Court schedule as it 
applied to the amount earned by the defendant ... the amount of 
restitution actually set was one which best accorded With defen-
dant's ability to pay.120 
If sentencing judges employ guidelines to assist them in calculating unli-
quidated damages, then such restitution orders may be able to meet 
the extremely stringent due process standards put forward in Welden. 
VI. GUIDELINES 
A. The English Experiment 
Guidelines can serve two purposes in criminal restitution. First, their 
use may allow damage awards to meet due process requirements. Sec-
ond, guidelines may serve a practical function in assisting sentencing 
judges to determine damages awards in an expeditious manner. 
Guidelines may work better for some kinds of damages than others. 
English courts have already experimented with guidelines for injury pain 
and suffering. Constructing guidelines for emotional pain and suffering, 
however, may pose insurmountable difficulties. The factors involved in 
calculating lost future earnings may be too individualized to permit a 
guidelines approach. 
The English courts have tested guidelines to help criminal judges 
assess restitution for injury, pain, and suffering caused by physical 
wounds, but have not examined similar guidelines for calculating damages 
for emotional trauma. During the 1970s in England it became apparent 
that while criminal courts were largely successful in meeting the restitu-
tion needs of victims in property crime situations sentencing judges 
rarely provided reasonable restitution to violent crime victims. 
118. See. e.g .• People v. Wager. 129 Mich. App. 819. 342 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1983); State v. Barr. 99 Wash.2d 75. 658 P.2d 1247 (1983) (en banc). 
119. See Wager. 129 Mich. App. at 821-22. 342 N.W.2d at 622. 
120. Id. 
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A national study of compensation orders in magistrates' courts, 
which was undertaken by the Home Office Research Unit in 1974, 
demonstrated that, in cases of damage to property, 90 per cent 
of defendants convicted were ordered to pay compensation com-
pared with only 9 per cent of persons convicted of assault occa-
sioning actual bodily harm or wounding. l21 
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English criminal judges enjoy the power to order restitution for in-
jury, pain, and suffering, but they have been reluctant to undertake the 
difficult task of calculating such damages. "Whereas monetary loss in-
curred as a direct result of the offense can be readily quantified, 
calculating a figure in respect of the actual injury, pain and suffering 
tends to be seen by magistrates as something best left to the expertise 
of judges presiding in the civil courts."l22 
The Home Office Research Unit initiated a study to see whether 
criminal courts would be more willing to award restitution for injury 
pain and suffering if guidelines were established to determine the amount 
of damages for specific kinds of injuries. 
In an attempt to overcome this problem and thus encourage a 
wider use of compensation for injury, in June 1976 magistrates 
from the four South Yorkshire benches began to operate 
guidelines, which were drawn up by the liaison judge for. South 
Yorkshire. These were subsequently adopted by the Solihull 
Magistrates Court.123 
The Guidelines were a considerable success in the South Yorkshire 
and Solihull courts. Before the Guidelines these courts had only awarded 
damages for injury, pain, and suffering in two percent of the cases, but 
after the guidelines awards were made in twenty-four percent of the 
cases.124 Of course, in the majority of the cases awards were still not 
made but these omissions were due to conscious choices because of the 
relationship between the victim and offender. In 31.7 percent of the 
cases the court did not award restitution because the violence took place 
in a domestic situation, a policy many feminists would attack, and in 
29.7 per cent no award was made due to victim provocation.125 Most im-
portantly, in only five of the 199 cases did the criminal court state that 
it rejected awarding damages for injury, pain, and suffering because the 
assessment would be better left to a civil court.126 "In the opinion of 




124. Id. at 513. 
125. Id .• at 514. 
126. Id .• at 514-15. 
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the clerks and bench chairmen it was largely as a result of using the 
guidelines that the bench was no longer constrained by the problem of 
assessing a suitable amount."127 
The South Yorkshire Guidelines scaled awards according to the grav-
ity of the injury. The recommended award for a blow without a bruise 
was £ 5 sterling; for a bruise with a small cut up to £ 30; for a cut 
with stitches between £ 25 to £ 75; and for a fracture over £ 50.128 The 
theory behind the Guidelines is that a more serious physical injury pro-
bably entails more pain and suffering.l29 Magistrates could award more 
or less than the Guidelines figure, and did so in a significant number 
of the cases. For example, in eight of the eleven fracture cases 
magistrates awarded less than the recommended amount yo Such ad-
justments are a healthy way of keeping guidelines in touch with the 
judicial perception of reality. Nonetheless, judicial discretion may raise 
due process questions about whether there are any real standards. The 
majority of magistrates and clerks involved in the study had favorable 
opinions regarding use of the Guidelines.131 
In 1986 Parliament was seriously considering extending the guidelines 
approach to all criminal courts. 
The Hodgson Commission has recommended that courts be re-
quired by legislation to consider a compensation order in every 
case; the Home Secretary is considering the feasibility of requir-
ing courts to give reasons for not imposing a compensation order 
in any case involving personal injury, loss or damage. One un-
doubted difficulty is that of assessing the appropriate amount 
of compensation in personal injury cases. The Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board is drawing up a set of guidelines on levels 
of compensation for various kinds of injury, and it is hoped that 
this will reduce some of the complexity of decisions which 
magistrates are expected to take in these cases.132 
If the English courts adopt the guidelines concept for determining restitu-
tion on a widespread basis it will provide a useful lesson for whether 
American courts should do the same. 
B. Emotional Pain and Suffering 
So far, the British guidelines have not included damages for emo-
tional pain and suffering. There are greater conceptual and practical dif-
127. [d., at 515. 
128. [d., at 518. 
129. [d. 
130. [d. 
131. [d., at 519. 
132. Ashworth, Punishment and Compensation: Victims, Offenders and the State, 6 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 86, 117-18 (1986). 
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ficulties associated with calculating damages for emotional pain and suf-
fering. Although estimating the extent of a victim's pain and suffering 
is always problematic. emotional pain and suffering may vary more 
among victims than physical pain and suffering does among victims who 
receive similar physical injuries. Emotional pain and suffering can be 
very significant specially for victims of sexual assault. The factors in-
volved in assessing emotional pain and suffering. however. are so com-
plex that a guidelines approach probably will not work. Likewise. calcula-
tions for lost future earnings entail too many individual aspects that 
cannot be reduced to general formulas. 
A guidelines approach is relatively well suited to the context of in-
jury pain and suffering. If two victims both receive a broken arm as 
the result of a crime. giving each victim approximately the same amount 
of compensation seems reasonably fair. Of course. there may be some 
differences in how two victims experience pain from a similar physical 
injury. One victim may suffer a more complicated and. perhaps. painful 
type of bone fracture. Children and elderly people may. on average. be 
more sensitive to physical pain. While every injury is in one sense unique. 
physical injuries appear comparatively well suited to a quantitative ap-
proach. We cannot measure how much pain a person feels. but calculating 
injury pain and suffering based on the seriousness of the physical in-
jury is as good a criterion as we are likely to find. 
Since even similar injuries such as bone fractures vary a great deal 
it probably makes sense to give judges some discretion concerning the 
amount of the award. On the other hand. clearly one goal of guidelines 
is to achieve some degree of uniformity. The question of how much discre-
tion sentencing judges ought to have. and how sentence guidelines should 
structure that discretion are topics of enormous controversy.l33 Probably 
the best way to sum up the experience with sentence guidelines is that 
both too much judicial discretion. and rigid. inflexible guidelines are 
bad.l34 The newly adopted United States Sentencing Guidelines give 
sentencing judges the discretion to increase or decrease a guideline 
sentence by twenty-five percent. which seems to be a reasonable com-
promise.13s 
From a policy standpoint the best approach would be to give judges 
some discretion to depart from the guidelines to take into account in-
dividual differences. There is. however. the constitutional problem raised 
in Welden about whether there are ascertainable standards to meet due 
prpcess requirements. Legislatures can minimize the possibility that 
restitution guidelines which allow judges some discretion will be struck 
133. See Note. How Unreliable Factfinding Can Undermine Sentencing Guidelines. 
95 YALE L.J. 1258 (1986) (surveying the literature on sentence guidelines). 
134. [d. 
135. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY 
STATEMENTS FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS § 5.1 (April 13. 1987) (sentencing table). 
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down as constitutionally infirm by establishing statutory criteria 
delineating when judges can depart from the guidelines amount for 
restitution.l38 A statute could set out permissible factors for increasing 
or decreasing a restitution award for injury, pain, and suffering. For 
example, a judge could reduce the award if he finds that there was some 
significant degree of victim provocation. On the other hand, a judge might 
increase the award if a child or an elderly victim were involved. Employ-
ing statutory departure criteria would permit judges some flexibility 
without allowing judges unfettered discretion that might violate a defen-
dant's due process rights. 
Guidelines are compatible with a moderate amount of discretion. If 
the majority of cases, however, are significantly different such that 
judges must depart from the guidelines often and by a wide amount, 
the guidelines would likely be impractical. Consequently, the extent of 
a judge's discretion could be constitutionally suspect. Take, for exam-
ple, emotional pain and suffering, or lost future earnings which could 
demand many departures from the guidelines. 
Emotional pain and suffering does not lend itself well to a guideline 
approach. The seriousness of a physical injury can be measured with 
a reasonable amount of certainty, and damages for injury pain and suf-
fering can be scaled according to the seriousness of the physical injury. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to compare the psychological state of 
a victim before and after a crime. The same kind of criminal activity 
can cause vastly different psychological responses in two different vic-
tims. A criminal may commit a mugging in the exact same way on suc-
cessive nights against two different victims. One victim may suffer from 
nightmares and anxiety attacks for months, while the other victim is 
barely affected. Sexual crimes are specially traumatic, but even among 
rape victims there is considerable variation in the extent of the 
psychological harm caused by the crime.l37 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
declared in State v. Fader, "A sexual assault victim's loss is difficult 
to quantify ... .It would include the cost of necessary treatment and 
related expenses, but beyond that, one gets into the realm of specula-
tion."l38 It is very difficult to develop criteria for deciding which rape 
or mugging victims are more likely to experience great emotional pain 
and suffering. There are too many individual variations in psychological 
type for a guidelines system to successfully quantify emotional pain and 
suffering monetarily. 
136. Minnesota allows sentencing judges to depart from the sentence guidelines 
for "substantial and compelling" circumstances. See. e.g .• State v. Wellman. 341 N.W. 561. 
561-63 (Minn. 1983) (double departure is permissible). 
137. See Estrich. supra note 13. 
138. 358 N.W.2d 42. 48 (Minn. 1984). 
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In addition, there are too many individual factors essential in the 
calculation of lost future earnings to allow a workable system of 
guidelines. There is a concern with regard to the extent of a victim's 
disablement. A leg injury could mean that the victim is disabled by either 
twenty or forty per cent. Much would depend on what type of work 
the victim did before the injury. A physical injury would probably reduce 
the future earning capacity of an outdoor worker more than a seden-
tary worker. These factors are too complex and individualized to reduce 
to guidelines. 
Also, there is a concern with regard to the earning capacity a per-
son would have had in the future without suffering an injury. The plain-
tiff and defendant will present experts who may offer widely different 
assessment on both these issues. The calculation of lost future earnings 
is, as Judge Posner argues, too complex for criminal courts in most cases. 
The Louisiana Appellate Court, nonetheless, has upheld a restitution 
order by a sentencing court for lost future earnings.139 Comprehensive 
guidelines for assessing lost future earning capacity are probably un-
workable. It is commonplace, however, for civil judges to use standard 
tables to calculate a person's future life expectancy, and for determin-
ing the present value of a future stream of earnings. Guidelines are useful 
in some, but not all circumstances. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Some kinds of unliquidated damages are too complex for criminal 
judges to resolve in a sentencing hearing, but a guidelines approach could 
be used to calculate pain and suffering resulting from an injury. 
Generalizations are danger~ous. Most courts have accepted the common 
wisdom that unliquidated damages are simply too complex to award in 
a summary sentencing proceeding. Instead of viewing all varieties of 
unliquidated damages as a homogeneous mass, a court must examine 
each type of unliquidated damages on a case by case basis to determine 
whether such damages could be calculated by the criminal judge without 
unnecessarily prolonging the sentencing hearing. Injury pain and suf-
fering can fit within the criminal process. 
Even if it is possible to award damages for injury pain and suffer-
ing, should the criminal justice system devote the necessary resources 
when almost all jurisdictions face serious budget constraints? Today, pro-
viding the fullest possible compensation to victims is a high priority in 
most jurisdictions; as a result, criminal judges should order restitution 
in every case for the full range of damages unless there are strong 
reasons not to award a particular kind of damages.14o The presumption 
139. Fountain. 768 F.2d at 801-02; Spell. 461 So. at 656·57 & n.3. 
140. SENATE REPORT. supra note 16. at 2536-39. 
86 CAPIT AL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:55 
in the VWP A is that a judge should order restitution in every case unless 
calculating the award would "unduly complicate or prolong the sentenc-
ing process."Ul The Senate Report accompanying the VWP A made it 
clear that the criminal justice system must strive to achieve the fullest 
possible amount of victim restitution. 
The principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually 
every formal system of criminal justice, of every culture and 
every time. It holds that, whatever else the sanctioning power 
of society does to punish its wrongdoers, it should also insure 
that the wrongdoer is required to the degree possible to restore 
the victim to his or her prior state of well-being.142 
Criminal courts must balance the cost of calculating a restitution 
award against the benefit in satisfying the needs of the victim. Even 
in the case of injury pain and suffering some types of injuries may pre-
sent complex problems better left to civil courts. The present system, 
however, is inefficient because it automatically assumes that all forms 
of unliquidated damages are too complex to resolve in a sentencing hear-
ing. Only a case by case approach can achieve optimal results. Judges 
should have the power to calculate awards for emotional pain and suf-
fering, and for lost future earnings if they feel the issues in a given 
case are simple enough to resolve in a summary sentencing hearing. 
Economic efficiency is usually enhanced when decisions are left to in-
dividuals rather than proscribed by legislative fiat. Each judge should 
have the discretion to decide when unliquidated damages can be resolved 
by him or her in a sentencing hearing, and when they must be dealt 
with by a civil court. 
There are some differences in how liquidated and unliquidated 
damages should be treated. A judge is obligated by the VWPA to award 
restitution for liquidated damages unless he or she provides a written 
justification.l43 Thus, there is a strong presumption in the VWPA that 
sentencing judges ought to order restitution for liquidated damages. Unli-
quidated damages in general are more complex than liquidated damages. 
A different presumption should exist concerning restitution for unli-
quidated damages. If a guideline approach is adopted for injury, pain, 
and suffering, there should be a presumption in favor of such awards 
but it should be less strong than the one employed for liquidated 
damages. A trial judge would be required to explain in writing when 
he believes that a particular injury is too complex to permit a reasonable 
award calculation using the guidelines. Appellate courts should accept 
141. Id .• at 2537. 
142. Id .• at 2536. 
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982). 
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this written statement unless it is clear that the trial judge is attemp-
ting to avoid any use of the guidelines for injury, pain, and suffering 
because he is philosophically opposed to guidelines, or to allowing criminal 
courts to award unliquidated damages. If a legislature adopts such 
guidelines judges should use them at least in the easy cases. Judges 
should have the discretion to award damages for emotional pain and 
suffering, and for lost future earnings, but judges should not have to 
justify a decision not to award such damages. These damages will re-
main largely in the civil sphere, but, as Judge Posner has suggested, 
there is no reason not to award damages for lost future earnings if the 
defendant can present no objections to the amount.144 
Even if sentencing judges obtain the power to award unliquidated 
damages, many crime victims will still have to seek civil remedies. 
Reforms should be undertaken wherever necessary to improve the col-
lection techniques available to crime victims in the civil arena. Even 
at best, however, civil courts are ill suited for the task of getting the 
average impoverished violent criminal to pay. Criminal courts have bet-
ter tools for collecting debts from violent criminals: revocation powers 
and probation officers.145 While there are a number of philosophical and 
theoretical problems, legislatures should at least consider allowing 
criminal courts some role in collecting civil damages related to the of-
fensive behavior. Whether a criminal or a civil court determines a damage 
award should not make an enormous difference in whether a victim is 
likely to collect. Civil and criminal courts should work together in help-
ing victims to obtain compensation from offenders. Already the VWP A 
allows a victim to enforce a criminal restitution order in a civil court 
"in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action."u6 Such reciprocity 
should work in both directions. Criminal courts should be able to help 
victims who win civil judgments. 
It is impractical to resolve all damage issues through the criminal 
process unless we are willing to transform the summary sentencing hear-
ing into a lengthy and costly mini-trial. There are some real differences 
between civil and criminal courts in terms of what kinds of damage ques-
tions they can most effectively handle. Civil courts may be better forums 
to settle some types of restitution issues including some varieties of 
white-collar crime, and of unliquidated damages. Too many artificial 
distinctions, however, have been made with regard to what criminal and 
civil courts can do for crime victims. The presumption should be in favor 
of deciding restitution issues in criminal courts unless the costs are 
clearly too high. Victims should not have to undertake the expense of 
144. Fountain. 768 F.2d at 802. 
145. See notes 32-60 supra and accompanying text. 
146. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) (1982). 
88 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:55 
initiating a civil action, and of attempting to collect a civil damage award 
unless there are strong reasons why the criminal justice system cannot 
determine the victim's losses, and order restitution. The goal should be 
the same for both the civil and criminal courts in deciding the damage 
issue. Both criminal and civil courts must work harder to insure that 
those offenders who can pay do pay. There are no panaceas for 
guaranteeing full victim compensation; nonetheless, a better job can be 
done. 
